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DEWEY’S EPISTEMOLOGY: 
AN ARGUMENT FOR WARRANTED ASSERTIONS, KNOWING,  
AND MEANINGFUL CLASSROOM PRACTICE 
 
Deron R. Boyles 
Georgia State University 
 
In Discipleship or Pilgrimage?: The Educator’s Quest for Philosophy, Tony 
Johnson criticizes philosophers of education for being, among other things, so infatuated 
with professional philosophy that they lose sight of the connections between philosophy 
and practical life.1  The history Johnson outlines indicates that philosophy of education 
was officially “born” at the hotel Traymore in Atlantic City, New Jersey on February 24, 
1935 (the founding of The John Dewey Society) or in 1941 with the founding of the 
Philosophy of Education Society (North American).2  Regardless, Johnson’s point is that 
in an effort to gain respectability as a learned society or guild, philosophers of education 
gave up social relevancy for academic respectability.  In an effort to navigate the 
treacherous path between and among professionalism and social relevancy, this paper 
takes up an area of professional philosophy—epistemology—with the intention of 
reclaiming the integrative role John Dewey held for philosophy and classroom practice.  
That is, I wish to revive a particular epistemological view in order to bridge the 
professional field of epistemology with classroom practice. 
As an area within professional philosophy, epistemology went through a variety 
of transformations in the twentieth century.  From traditional accounts of knowledge 
favored by analytic philosophers to the relativists’ outright rejection of epistemology as a 
valuable area of inquiry, epistemology was tossed around and sometimes tossed out of 
                                                     
1 Tony W. Johnson, Discipleship or Pilgrimage?: The Educator’s Quest for Philosophy (Albany:  SUNY 
Press, 1995). 
2 Ibid., 1. 
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many investigations.  Still, but not unproblematically, epistemology as a term continued 
to be used in discourse concerning pure knowledge, practical knowledge, social 
constructed knowledge, and the like.  Aside from those professional philosophers who 
took up the area of epistemology as a primary focus of study,3 epistemology seemed to 
both fall out of favor as a major area of focus for those interested in education and 
schooling and fall into favor as a buzzword to add an aura of respectability to various 
research articles and agendas.   
The term “epistemology” has been widely sprinkled amid myriad articles, but as a 
primary focus of work in the area of education, the field is rarely evidenced.  As regards 
Dewey and epistemology, there are limited examples from within the pages of this 
journal.  Jeanne Connell’s work comparing Dewey’s epistemology to Rosenblatt’s reader 
response theory is one instance and she provides insight regarding the concept 
transaction.4 Joe R. Burnett explores Dewey’s later thinking and connects Dewey’s 
theory of inquiry to a theory of aesthetic and religious experience.5 Phillip Eddy 
compares Dewey and Kolberg and identifies the role of formal structures in thought 
connected to epistemology.6  Differently, Barry Duff argues that by investigating “event” 
in Dewey’s later thinking, we can better understand what he claims is a wide 
misunderstanding of Dewey’s notion of “experience.”7 Duff notes that “because Dewey 
rejects ‘the ubiquity of all comprehensive cognitive experience’ and does not identify the 
                                                     
3 See, for example, authors in compendiums like Linda Alcoff, ed., Epistemology:  The Big Questions 
(Oxford:  Blackwell, 1998); and Jonathan Dancy and Ernest Sosa, eds., A Companion to Epistemology 
(Oxford:  Blackwell, 1993). 
4 Jeanne Connell, “Assessing the Influence of Dewey’s Epistemology on Rosenblatt’s Reader Response 
Theory,” Educational Theory 46, 6 (Fall 1996): 395-413. 
5 Joe R. Burnett, “Dewey’s Educational Thought in His Mature Philosophy,” Educational Theory 38, 2 
(Spring 1988): 203-211. 
6 Philip Eddy, “Kohlberg and Dewey,” Educational Theory 38, 4 (Fall 1988):  405-413. 
7 Barry E. Duff, “’Event’ in Dewey’s Philosophy,” Educational Theory 40, 4 (Fall 1990):  463-470. 
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real within the cognitive, the concept of knowledge does not have the importance in his 
philosophy that it has in others.”8  Still differently, and not explicitly epistemological, 
Craig Cunningham investigates Dewey’s later conception of the self and explores 
features of unique potential relating, ultimately, to character education in schools.9   
Perhaps closer to the point are Greg Seals’ efforts at explaining Dewey’s science 
of teaching and Barbara Stengel’s work relating Dewey’s concept of “method of 
intelligence” to schooling.10  Seals proposes a frame of reference from which teaching 
and learning are seen “as a field of scientific endeavor in its own right.”11  Stengel, in 
comparing and questioning various texts’ use of Dewey and what implications for teacher 
practice might obtain from understanding a “method intelligence,” makes important 
suggestions for teacher knowledge and practice.  Still, like those noted earlier, taking up 
the specific topic of Deweyan epistemology was not the primary focus of either essay.  
This is not, of course, a criticism of any of the theorists or their work.  The point is 
simply to indicate that specific inquiry into Dewey’s epistemology, per se, is rare in the 
pages of this journal.  For philosophy of education, more broadly, I wonder whether the 
occasional forays into epistemology failed to become a primary focus because 
epistemology, generally, was (and is?) seen as suffering from a hypertrophied and 
myopic focus on traditional accounts of “pure” knowledge. 
 
 
                                                     
8 Ibid., 465n.  Duff cites Dewey, Experience and Nature in John Dewey, The Later Works, 1925-1953.  
Volume 1:  1925, ed., Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale:  Southern Illinois University Press, 1981), 30. 
9 Craig Cunningham, “Unique Potential:  A Metaphor for John Dewey’s Later Conception of the Self,” 
Educational Theory 44, 2 (Spring 1994):  211-224. 
10 Greg Seals, “Conceptualizing Teaching as Science:  John Dewey in Dialogue with the National Research 
Council,” Educational Theory 54, 1 (2004):  1-26; and Barbara S. Stengel, “Making Use of the Method of 
Intelligence,” Educational Theory 51, 1 (Winter 2001):  109-125. 
11 Seals, 1. 
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Historical Considerations for Connecting and Clarifying Deweyan Epistemology 
The relatively recent history of epistemology included and was dominated by 
Russell, Frege, Moore, and others committed to an analytic view of professional 
philosophy.  Language, correspondence theories, independent reality, and 
foundationalism were major foci at the beginning of the twentieth century.  James, 
Dewey, and other pragmatists, however, launched an attack on the analytic approach in 
the early 1900s and Dewey and Russell engaged in well-known debates about the nature 
of knowledge and the various requirements for one to be said to know anything at all.12  
Just prior to Russell, however, were other critics like new realists and critical realists.  
New realists William Montague and Ralph Barton Perry, who were students of the 
idealist Josiah Royce, mounted an effort to promote a non-Roycean pluralism that 
nonetheless held out hope for a doctrine of immediate perception and the independence 
of objects in epistemological inquiry.  J.B. Pratt and other critical realists rejected the 
new realists’ doctrine of immediate perception because they did not believe that 
perception was unmediated.  They held, instead, that the mind is a mediating factory 
between physical objects, perception, and meaning.13   
Dewey faced criticism from virtually all of these foregoing philosophers but 
continually rejected attacks on his naturalistic empiricism.  He set out to clarify what he 
meant by truth, reality, and knowledge and was often writing in defense of his views.  
While he accepted some of the new realist claims (e.g., reality is not dependent on human 
consciousness), Dewey did not accept central points like the absolute independence of 
                                                     
12 Tom Burke, Dewey’s New Logic:  A Reply to Russell (Chicago:  The University of Chicago Press, 1994). 
13 See, for example, Bruce Kuklick, Rise of American Philosophy:  Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1860-1930 
(New Haven:  Yale University Press, 1977). 
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things from thoughts.14  Instead, Dewey offered a theory that opposed both idealism and 
the variants of realism:  he argued that knowledge and experience are not coextensive.  
Dewey also rejected defining perception (rank or base empiricism) as knowledge because 
of the problem of immediacy.  Knowledge cannot be had in an instant.  It takes time and 
is an achievement.  Knowledge eventually comes; “it is the result of situated processes 
that were initiated to respond to specific problems.”15  Perception is not immediate either.  
Perceiving takes time and involves habits.  Perceiving, as Dewey pointed out in his paper 
“The Reflect Arc Concept in Psychology,” means data are screened, chosen, and 
refined.16  Indeed, as Hildebrand points out, such activities as perceiving and knowing 
“always occur within the context of larger ‘situations,’ a nexus of ongoing processes and 
purposes.”17 
Dewey therefore rejected traditional accounts of epistemology.  He did so, in part, 
because he saw traditional epistemology as a hollow area of inquiry given the primacy of 
the truth condition in the traditional syllogism (S knows that p iff: p, S believes that p, and 
S justifies that p).  He saw the disconnected nature of the theories philosophers were 
putting forward.  In separating out the contexts of perception and the knowing that 
results, Dewey was frustrated by new realist, critical realist, and idealist efforts at 
developing a theory of knowledge.  I wonder whether his frustration is also felt in more 
current times.  Contemporary neo-pragmatists like Rorty and Putnam, like Dewey, reject 
notions of correspondence and see correspondence theories of truth as being central to 
questions of epistemology that the enterprise of epistemology itself is called into 
                                                     
14 See David L. Hildebrand, Beyond Realism and Anti-Realism:  John Dewey and the Neopragmatists 
(Nashville:  Vanderbilt University Press, 2003). 
15 Ibid., 24. 
16 John Dewey, “The Reflect Arc Concept in Psychoogy,” in The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882-1898, 
ed., Jo Ann Boydson (Carbondale:  Southern Illinois University Press, 1972), volume 5. 
17 Hildebrand, 24-25. 
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question.18  One arguable result is that those interested in a pragmatic theory of 
knowledge find themselves continually mounting their defense in terms of traditional 
epistemology, contrasting though the terms may be.  Another result seems to me to be a 
dearth of inquiry that bridges the work of professional philosophers studying 
epistemology with philosophers of education studying epistemology and linking it to 
classroom practice. 
One consequence, then, appears to be that in the process of rejecting various 
major components of epistemology, the enterprise of inquiring into knowledge and 
knowing has largely been discredited or disregarded—at least to the degree that those in 
education are rarely if ever part of the larger conversation concerning epistemology (and 
those within epistemology are rarely if ever part of the larger conversation concerning 
education).19  I wish to assert that epistemology can and should represent an area of 
inquiry that is relevant and useful for philosophy of education, especially as it develops 
classroom practices that foster inquiry.  I specifically wish to revive Dewey’s conception 
of warranted assertibility in an effort to show the value of fallibilist epistemology in 
practical and social teaching and learning contexts.  By highlighting the distinctions 
                                                     
18 See, for example, Richard Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism:  Essays, 1972-1980 (Minneapolis:  
University of Minnesota Press, 1982); Herman J. Saatkamp, ed., Rorty and Pragmatism:  The Philosopher 
Responds to His Critics (Nashville:  Vanderbilt University Press, 1995); Hilary Putnam, Pragmatism:  An 
Open Question (Cambridge:  Blackwell, 1995); and Hilary Putnam, The Threefold Cord:  Mind, Body, and 
World (New York:  Columbia University Press, 1999). 
19 There are exceptions, of course.  Some philosophers of education engaging in epistemology proper 
include Israel Scheffler’s classic work Conditions of Knowledge:  An Introduction to Epistemology and 
Education (Chicago: Scott, Foresman, and Company, 1965).  There are also examples of essays like 
Christine McCarthy, “When You Know It, and I Know It, What Is It We Know?  Pragmatic Realism and 
the Epistemological Absolute,” Philosophy of Education, ed. Frank Margonis (Urbana: Philosophy of 
Education Society, 1996); Barbara Thayer-Bacon, “Using the ‘R’ Word Again: Pragmatism as Qualified 
Relativism,” Philosophical Studies in Education 33 (2003): 93-103; and Richard S. Prawat, “Dewey, 
Peirce, and the Learning Paradox,” American Educational Research Journal 36, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 47-
76.  For a compendium of philosophers writing on education, see Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, Philosophers 
on Education: New Historical Perspectives (New York: Routledge, 1998).  See, especially, Alvin I. 
Goldman, “Education and Social Epistemology,” in Philosophers of Education, op. cit., 439-450. 
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between traditional epistemology (via Russell, Frege, etc.) and Dewey’s conception of 
knowing, epistemology will be shown to have value insofar as it highlights a more useful, 
instrumentalist theory of knowing that is applicable to classroom practice. 
 
Rejecting Traditional Epistemology:  Developing a Theory of Inquiry 
In The Quest for Certainty, Dewey argues for the overthrow of traditional 
epistemology.20  He specifically rejects the “Spectator Theory of Knowledge,” (STK) and 
argues, as some have taken it, against epistemology writ large.21  I disagree with the 
conclusion that Dewey throws out epistemology as a whole.  In setting STK aside, 
Dewey sets much of traditional epistemology aside, but he clearly does not argue against 
knowing or the known.  He argues against the reliance on ontological and metaphysical 
ideals entailed by traditional accounts of “pure knowledge.”  In place of such a traditional 
account, Dewey crafts a new version of epistemology—one that has as a key element the 
notion of warranted assertibility.22 
Warrented assertions replace justification in the traditional syllogism while at the 
same time imploding the syllogism itself.  Where justification served a correspondence 
theory of truth in the traditional account of knowledge, warranted assertions merge truth 
and inquiry together in such a way that correspondence to an external world is no longer 
the point.  The point, instead, is the interdependency of truths and the processes of 
                                                     
20 John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty: A Study of the Relation of Knowledge and Action.  in Jo Ann 
Boydson, ed., John Dewey: The Later Works, 1925-1953, Volume 4, 1929 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois 
University, 1988), 1-250.  See, also, John Dewey and Arthur F. Bentley, Knowing and the Known (New 
York: Beacon Press, 1949). 
21 See, for example, Christopher Kulp, The End of Epistemology: Dewey and His Current Allies on the 
Spectator Theory of Knowledge (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992). 
22 See John Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (New York: Henry Hold and Company, 1938). 
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inquiry:  the temporal satisfaction of solved problems in a world that is not set apart from 
the knower’s use(s) of the world or place(s) in that world.  In this way, idealists and 
realists are misguided when they describe epistemology as way of determining 
knowledge.23  “Knowledge” is not the focal point of epistemology for Dewey:  
“knowing” is.  “Knowledge” represents the end of inquiry but, according to Dewey, it is 
also often supposed to have a meaning of its own—disconnected from inquiry.  The 
result is that inquiry is subordinated to the fixed end called “knowledge.”24  By 
“knowing” Dewey means inquiry in a world that is not static.  He means inquiry into 
things “lived” by people.  He means experimenting with solving problems such that the 
action entailed in the solving of problems is inquiry itself and warranted in the assertions 
made about the solved problem when it is solved (where “solved” is understood as 
temporal and a portal to further inquiry).  Accordingly, in the “living” of life, problems 
will be faced and solved—often in serendipitous ways—such that achieving “justified 
true belief” (as traditional epistemology expects) is not useful.  As Dewey put it: 
[Warranted assertion] is preferred to the terms belief and knowledge [because] it is 
free from the ambiguity of these latter terms, and it involves reference to inquiry 
as that which warrants assertion.  When knowledge is taken as a general abstract 
term related to inquiry in the abstract, it means “warranted assertibility.”  The use 
of a term that designates potentiality rather than an actuality involves recognition 
that all special conclusions of special inquiries are parts of enterprise that is 
continually renewed, or is a going concern.25 
                                                     
23 Hildebrand, 136ff. 
24 Dewey, Logic, 8. 
25 Ibid., 9.  Emphasis in original. 
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 At least two things follow from warranted assertions:  1) knowing is not 
sufficiently described as an abstract, semantic enterprise—rather it is an enterprise rooted 
in problems faced by people in context (Dewey is arguing for knowers as people who can 
defend their claims to knowledge [a form of epistemic responsibility]); and 2) that one 
can know, but fallibilistically so rather than foundationally so.  Knowledge claims can 
exist for fallibilists like Dewey, in other words, but without commitment to universality 
and without commitment to linguistic correspondence to extra-linguistic “fact.”  This is 
so because, according to Dewey, there is no use or meaning that is derived sans living.  
Language is a tool to make sense of our experiences, but it derives its meaning and utility 
from our lives. 
Our lives should be guided, on Dewey’s view, by inquiry:  “the controlled or 
directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into one that is so determinate in its 
constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the elements of the original situation 
into a unified whole.”26  Knowing comes about when inquiry leads to an understanding 
that goes beyond mere apprehension.  One might “understand,” i.e., “apprehend” the 
ideas of moose, chemical elements, or musical notes, but knowing requires having a 
sense of grounds (the “warrant”) for asserting their existence.27  This is a key point to 
which I will return later in discussing warranted assertions and classroom practice.  
Before then, however, consider how traditional notions like “truth” and “proposition” in 
the history of epistemology differ from elements within Dewey’s theory of inquiry. 
 
Logic, Truth, and the Confusion over Propositions and Judgements 
                                                     
26 Ibid., 104-105. 
27 Ibid., 143. 
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Traditional epistemology arguably extends back at least to Plato, but the content 
or structural elements of syllogisms concerning knowledge found, say, in Plato’s 
Theaetetus, only provide a starting point for understanding the development (or lack 
thereof) of traditional epistemology.  I wish to stipulate that the zenith of traditional 
epistemology is found in the analytic philosophy of Russell, Frege, the early 
Wittgenstein, etc.  With those philosophers, the point was to achieve correspondence 
between uttered claims and extra-linguistic fact.  The truth condition in the traditional 
syllogism of epistemology, in other words, was the point.  The belief and justification 
conditions served the truth condition.  Said differently, and more broadly, epistemology 
served a correspondence theory of truth.  This point is important because key terms used 
most prominently by Russell distort Dewey’s epistemology.  Specifically, as Burke notes, 
Russell misapplied the term proposition when considering Dewey’s theory of logic and 
his entailing theory of knowledge.28  Russell could not divorce propositions from a 
theory of truth, but Dewey’s logic and epistemology relied on judgements and their 
warranted assertibility, not truth-focused propositions.  As a result, Dewey rejected the 
metaphysics undergirding Plato, Russell, and others, even if sometimes in confusing 
ways. 
 
 to 
or 
                                                     
For Russell, propositions were sentences.  They were fodder for linguistic 
analysis.  Accordingly, Dewey’s notion of warranted assertibility—as Russell understood
it—was an inadequate account of truth and was considered by Russell to be irrelevant
logic anyway.29  The problem here is that warranted assertibility was not intended 
28 Burke, op. cit. 
29 See Bertrand Russell, “Dewey’s New Logic” in The Philosophy of John Dewey, ed., Paul A. Schilpp 
(New York:  Tudor, 1939):  135-156; and Bertrand Russell, An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth (New 
York:  George Allen & Unwin, 1940). 
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claimed by Dewey to be an account of truth where truth is understood in terms of 
traditional notions of correspondence.  Where propositions are either confirmed or 
refuted, judgements are, on Dewey’s view, said to be warrantably assertible or not.
Where Russell elevated truth to the level of STK, Dewey saw truth and warranted 
assertions as connect, but not in the sa
  
me way Russell did, or in the same way authors 
like Ku
rete actions 
e.  
y factors of inquiry.  In 
Knowin
it.  In 
is 
lp and John Shook suggest.30 
On Dewey’s view, as Burke points out, “it is judgments, not propositions, which 
are warrantably assertible or not; and judgments are essentially rooted in conc
in the world insofar as the consequences of such actions serve to decide their 
warrantability.”31  This does not provide us with a theory of truth, but Dewey did not 
claim warranted assertibility as a theory of truth.  Dewey argued, instead, that warranted 
assertibility (rather than truth) should be a primary consideration in a theory of inferenc
What is true and what is false are conclusions, not the necessar
g and the Known, Dewey and Bentley put it this way: 
It is frequently said that no matter what form of inquiry one undertakes into life 
and mind one involves himself always in metaphysics and can never escape 
contrast with this hoary adage, our position is that if one seeks with enough 
earnestness to identify his attitude of workmanship and the directions of h
orientation, he can by-pass the metaphysics by the simple act of keeping 
                                                     
30 See Christoper Kulp, The End of Epistemology:  John Dewey and His Current Allies on the Spectato
Theory of Knowledge (Westport, CT:  Greenwood Press, 1992); and John Shook, D
r 
ewey’s Theory of 
nd Knowledge (Nashville:  Vanderbilt University Press, 2000). Empirical Reality a
31 Burke, 238. 
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observation and postulation hand-in-hand; the varied “ultimates” of metaphysi
become chips that lie where they fall.
cs 
mulated 
of 
Educat
assertio ey: 
 
e 
 
ect 
latter 
 to name the former….However, the important 
                                                     
32 
As Burke notes, “The truth or falsity of a given judgment is characterized in terms of 
relations and correspondence among expectation and actual result of actions for
in the course of the respective inquiry, but, strictly speaking, it is the assertion of the 
judgment which is true or not, not the information involved in ascertaining the 
judgment….”33  To say all of this somewhat differently, the warranted assertibility 
your judgment is “tangibly certifiable” through your concrete actions in the world.  
ive experiences provide the opportunity for solving problems via warranted 
ns.  The truth of your assertion is basically a metaphysical ideal.  Writes Dew
Judgment may be identified as the settled outcome of inquiry.  It is concerned
with the concluding objects that emerge from inquiry in their status of being 
conclusive.  Judgment in this sense is distinguished from propositions.  Th
content of the latter is intermediate and representative and is carried by symbols;
while judgment, as finally made, has direct existential import.  The terms 
affirmation and assertion are employed in current speech interchangeably.  But 
there is a difference…between the logical status of intermediate subject-matters 
that are taken for use in connection with what they lead to as means, and subj
matter which has be prepared to final.  I shall use assertion to designate the 
logical status and affirmation
entley, 81.  Emphasis added. 32 Dewey and B
33 Burke, 239. 
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matter is not the words, but the logical properties characteristic of different 
subject-matters.34 
Warranted assertibility, for Dewey, was part of a project to explain (1) what it means to
say that a statement about how things are  may or may not correspond to how things 
actually are, when at the same time, (2) it is not possible to step back and treat this 
correspondence as if it were a matter of comparing the statement against bare re
Burke puts it this way:  “It is not as if we have some statement-independent handle on 
bare reality so that we can hold it up to compare against our statements, since it is th
statements themselves and the processes that go into their making which are one’s han
on bare reality.”
 
ality.35  
e 
dle 
either does it describe nor explain how people 
actually
atly 
finition 
outside of experience [STK]…is what made me suspicious of the whole epistemological 
                                                     
36  What we have to do is make judgments in “real time” about 
consequences of actions in solving actual problems.  Correspondence, then, becomes a 
metaphor for Dewey, allowing him to point out that while a “spectator” version of 
detachment is not completely wrong, n
 use information from their lives to solves problems that they face.  The relevance 
of the “spectator” is in the very detachment Dewey eschews.  “Spectators” don’t assert, 
they passively observe.  “Spectators” are outside of experience—at least the kind of 
experience that is engaging of others. 
For Dewey, the speculative enterprise of traditional epistemology suffered gre
at the hands of “correspondence” theories because, as he wrote in 1941, “wondering at 
how something in experience could be asserted to correspond to something by de
y, “Propositions, Warranted Assertibility, and Truth,” Journal of 
7 (1941):  169-186. 
34 Dewey, Logic, 120.  Emphasis in original. 
35 Burke, 240.  See, also, John Dewe
Philosophy 38, 
36 Burke, 241. 
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industry.”37  Dewey, therefore, rejected STK and its detachments (the very thing that 
traditional accounts of correspondence endorse, e.g., Russell, Kulp, etc.) in orde
would have individual “knowers” “concretely and dynamically embedded in the 
world.”
r that we 
, 
ay 
Dewey concentrates so much attention on concrete situatedness means that no such 
uiry that 
demons  
 
assroom 
ledge 
cific ways.  That 
 
 other inquiries, given the principle of continuity 
                                                     
38  As a result, those “knowers” would have access to (mediated) knowledge
where knowledge is not understood in semantically detached terms.  Semantic 
detachment is indicative of the very correspondence Dewey eschews.  While it m
appear that some of Dewey’s views commit him to a form of idealism, the fact that 
entailment need obtain.  He is, instead, an operationalist.  He values inq
trates a connection between expected consequences and actual consequences.
 
Knowing, Knowledge, and Intelligence:  Epistemology Goes to School 
Here it may be helpful to distinguish between a few key concepts in order to
better understand the import of warranted assertibility and its relationship to cl
interaction.  Knowing, knowledge, and intelligence are distinct for Dewey.  Knowing is 
an inquiry (specific instances of applying oneself to solving problems), know
constitutes the stable outcomes of inquiry, and intelligence is the result of the 
development and accumulation of capabilities to act (i.e., inquire) in spe
is, intelligent action is action constructed in the light of properly anticipated 
consequences.  “Knowledge is the result of successful inquiry, whereas knowing consists
in using one’s intelligence in given inquiries.  Intelligence is stabilized 
knowledge…which can be utilized in
positions, Warranted Assertibility, and Truth,” 183. 37 Dewey, “Pro
38 Burke, 243. 
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and giv
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ration of what was gained in past 
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ic 
re 
and 
t Dewey suggests41 means students attempt 
stability rather than certainty.  They are not in the business of “discovering” the basic 
                                                     
en the fact that judgments are not merely abstract decisions but constitute a kind 
uct (assertion)….Knowing is to intelligence roughly what asserting is to being 
d to assert.”39  Says Dewey: 
...from the standpoint of empirical naturalism, the denotative reference of “m
and “intelligence” is to funding of meanings and significances, a funding which i
both a product of past inquiries or knowings and the means of enriching and 
controlling the subject-matters of subsequent experiences.  The function of 
enrichment and control is exercised by incorpo
experience in attitudes and habits which, in their interaction with the environment, 
create the clearer, better ordered, “fuller” or richer materials of later experienc
a process capable of indefinite continuance.40 
What we have in this quite is Dewey’s basic argument for classroom interaction.  Organ
and natural environments for learning impel knowing and the habits of intelligence.  
Detachment from natural environments for learning foster “spectating” and habits of 
routine.  When one supports a quest a for “meanings and significances,” one sides with 
inquiry via warranted assertions.  That is, given Dewey’s epistemology, classrooms 
should be places where students make knowledge claims at the very same time they a
engaged in knowing (inquiry), since the means and ends are not separable for Dewey, 
since the point of inquiry is not to college detached artifacts or pieces of the dead wood 
of the past.  Active engagement of the sor
39 Ibid., 256. 
40 John Dewey, “Experience, Knowledge, and Value:  A Rejoinder,” in The Philosophy of John Dewey, ed., 
Paul A. Schilpp (New York:  Tudor, 1939), 520-521. 
41 Dewey’s organic instrumentalism, not prescription or relativism. 
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on which traditional epistemology qua foundationalism relies.  Rather, stabil
indicates functionality over universality. 
Still, stability is not assured by Dewey either.  In fact, much of the point of 
ing “with the environment” is “creat[ing] the clearer, better ordered, ‘fuller’ or 
aterials of later experience—a process capable of in indefinite continuance.”42
[I]ntelligence is more than just a store of habits and context-sensitive dispositions
Intelligence is habitual, but not all habit is intelligent.  Experience guided by 
intelligent habit, rather than merely routine habit, is experience characterized by 
resourcefulness, inventiveness, ingenuity, tenacity, efficiency, and any such
“pragmatic virtue” designed to anticipate not only the regularities and constancies
of experience but also the inevitable uncertainties and indeterminacies.”43 
Epistemological fallibilists hold that knowledge claims can be valid, even if the veracity
of the knowledge claim is not universal.  Dewey, as a fallibilist, hones in on
the never-ending search for meaning as a way to indicate the limits of
respondence theories of truth) and he replaces correspondence and 
foundationalism with the warrantability of assertions and fallibilism. 
Ultimately, then, how valuable might warranted assertibility be for classroom 
interaction?  What would go on in classrooms that would be different from what curre
goes on in most school spheres?  What might it look like?  One way to address these 
questions is to envision new roles for teachers and students.  Following the notio
warranted assertibility, both teachers and students would become fallible knowers who 
must defend their claims to knowledge, where knowledge represents a temporal 
42 Dewey, “Experience, Knowledge, and Value,” op. cit. 
43 Burke, 256-257. 
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suspension point in the process of making judgments (Dewey’s theory of inquiry and his 
theory of logic).  In so doing, both teachers and students realize the limitations of 
universal, foundational, “comfort zones,” and demonstrate the kind of continual 
and re-thinking required of those who face change in their lives and who, as a result of
said change, must continually defend their claims to knowledge.  The “moose,” 
“chemical elements,” and “musical notes” examples from the beginning of this essay 
illustrate that identifying the ideas only represents narrative and the “comfort zones” of 
traditional epistemology (and traditional curriculum and schooling).  Even if “correctly 
identified,” the point of warranted assertibility is to determine meaning and connection 
with other ideas that are or represent real problems to solve.  In what possible wa
moose and musical notes connect?  What links are there to chemical elements and what 
do any and all of the particulars actually mean?  What contexts are required for 
understandin
thinking 
 
ys might 
g and what problems are within those contexts that would provide students 
opportu
nalize their 
nt 
ally so.  This point raises at least two issues:  A) the superstructure and 
metana
                                                     
nities for inquiry (proving that moose, music, and chemistry are of interest in the 
first place)? 
In characterizing the problem Dewey had with “intellectualists” and professional 
philosophers, Hildebrand notes the following:  “Sidetracked from the problematic and 
lived situation that instigated inquiry in the first place, philosophers institutio
practice…into an ontology with eternal permanence.”44  Teachers are rarely differe
from this characterization.  They, too, institutionalize their practice, even if 
hegemonic
rrative of schooling; and B) the specific responsibility of teachers in a given 
situation. 
44 Hidebrand, 64, 
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For the first point, one could argue that schools are structured to support a versio
of traditional epistemology.  If schools are not truly foundationalist, insofar as they 
expect students to amass “pure” knowledge via STK, then they are reliabilist insofar as 
they require only correct answers without justification.  While much more time could be 
spent on distinguishing the variations of epistemology within schools, one point seem
clear:  it is rare that teacher provide emergent contexts for the development of inquiry and 
knowing in the Deweyan sense.  In terms of the superstructure of schools, this only
makes sense.  Order, discipline, and time-on-task expectations do not support inquiry th
is varied, serendipitous, and transactional.  Save the unique examples within some 
schools, the reality in most schools is that traditional expectations have been so deeply 
entrenched prior to teachers and student actually entering the hallways, that the task of
changing schools is often seen as impossibl
n 
s 
 
at 
 
e.  Epistemologically, if a parallel could be 
made h
 
s 
fess to 
 
                                                     
ere, it is as though STK and the entailing correspondence theory of truth is the 
given and the taken for granted in schools. 
For the second point from above, when prospective teachers enter their course 
work as education majors (or for certification), it is not without ideas and experiences 
that inform what they want to do and how they want to do it, it simply is with virtually no
change whatsoever in the culture from which they came.  They were reared as spectator
(and often spectate in their college classes, too) and even when some students pro
wanting to “engage” their students in “active” learning, it still usually ends up being a 
souped-up version of traditional schooling—or as Dewey puts it Experience and 
Education, using “devices of art to cover up obviously brutal features.”45  Fear of losing a
job, fear of being reprimanded, and fear of standing out as “different” are common 
45 John Dewey, Experience and Education (New York:  Collier Books, 1938), 19. 
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excuses teachers give for not challenging an established school structure they
to be problematic.  It is in this sense that I wish to force the revolutionary point that 
teachers, regardless of the superstructure, have epistemological (and other ) 
responsibilities to their students.  At the risk of being perceived as another in a lon
of people who blame teachers, I nonetheless believe that teachers are in positions of 
power they may not even understand.  What is actually being asserted here is that 
teachers already have space and control over what goes on in their classrooms.  Beyond
the power that could be actualized from teacher shortages nationwide, add the poss
that teachers broaden their understanding of pedagogy by engaging in epistemolo
discourse, and change becomes imaginable.  There is, of course, no guarantee that 
teachers who enter such epistemological discourse will value Dewey’s notion of 
warranted assertibility over, say, the “certainty” often attached to foundationalism.  S
by actually championing the intellectual and practical possibilities of the very tea
risked blaming 
 understand 
g line 
 
ibility 
gical 
till, 
chers I 
a moment ago, I am urging a movement of teachers to claim school 
spaces 
the 
, 
in 
th the 
for themselves and their students in ways that are grounded in Deweyan 
epistemology. 
To envision classroom practices that specifically endorse warranted assertions 
would mean that students and teachers would no longer search for or operate under 
assumption of “the truth” in Platonic, Kantian, or “No Child Left Behind” terms.  Instead
students/teachers would make assertions connected to solving their problems (both 
immediate and connected to as-yet-unknown areas) that are gauged (i.e., judged) with
the bounds of human experience.  This not only represents an epistemological shift, it 
shifts power away from the traditional quest for certainty and places power wi
 19
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 blame 
vidence of 
s.  
ds, the 
rs and 
educati lic 
o 
 of 
es into being when the 
contexts of student/teacher living—one not divorced from social realities beyond school
and also not divorced from parent and social interaction.  In short, traditional 
epistemology and an entailing power structure that supports it may be largely to
for the general lack of inquiry found within U.S. classrooms.  Students as testable objects 
themselves, and whose role it is to gather discreet bits of data and information 
(knowledge?), are repeatedly subjected to a classroom sphere where the only e
relation is between teacher- and curriculum-imposed artifacts and superimposed goal
As has been alluded to, even good teachers are burdened by the perversion of 
correspondence seen most schools.  Never mind that the tests that are claimed to be 
“objective” and “neutral” are subjectively constructed—all the tests, the standar
mission statements, the learning objectives.  It makes little difference.  Because the 
presentation of that reality is repeated as “the real world” or “the way it is,” its 
unassailability is arguably the very feature privileged by STK in traditional epistemology.  
It seems as though the “view from nowhere” is precisely the view most educato
onal policy makers repeatedly expect.  It is no wonder, then, that most pub
school classrooms continue to be stultifying arenas for external indoctrination. 
Dewey’s epistemology, however, is an offering.  It is a possible “out.”  It 
represents one way students and teachers might develop relations in less contrived ways 
that what currently goes on in most schools.  By shifting roles of teachers and students s
that both groups are inquirers into problems they face, certitude goes out the window as 
the expectation for certitude is challenged.  In place of certainty (the entailing result
STK and correspondence theories of truth) is stability and it com
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engagement between teachers and students (and students and students, parents and 
students, etc.) supports inquiry leading to warranted assertions. 
